Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments by Güth, Werner et al.
Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited:
A Theoretical and Experimental Study
of Output-Dependent Prize Tournaments
Werner Gu¨th∗ Rene´ Lev´ınsky´∗§ Kerstin Pull† Ori Weisel‡¶
August 30, 2015
Abstract
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational
compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where
the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce ‘output-dependent prizes’
where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agents’ output – it is high
when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments
with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A
multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result.
Keywords: Tournaments, Relative performance, Experiment, Principal-agent
JEL Classifications: J3, L2
∗Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745 Jena, Germany
†Eberhard Karls Universita¨t Tu¨bingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Nauklerstrasse 47,
72074 Tu¨bingen, Germany
‡University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, NG7 2RD,
Nottingham, United Kingdom
§Corresponding author. Email: levinsky@econ.mpg.de, Tel. +49-3641-686 642
¶OW acknowledges support from the European Research Council (ERC-AdG 295707 COOPERATION)
1
1 Introduction and Motivation
Tournament incentives, based on relative, rather than absolute, performance, have become
an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems (Orrison
et al., 2004; Bothner et al., 2007). Starting with the seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen
(1981), the incentive properties of (fixed prize) tournament compensation systems have
repeatedly been analyzed (for an early review see McLaughlin, 1988; Kra¨kel, 2008, and
Gu¨rtler and Kra¨kel, 2010, are examples of recent studies). A general observation from this
literature is that tournaments can, under certain circumstances (mainly the risk-neutrality
of the agents), induce the same efforts from agents as piece rates, allowing principals to
economize on measurement costs (as rank order is typically easier to measure than cardinal
performance) and to allocate indivisible rewards without sacrificing production efficiency.
In some situations tournaments can be even more efficient than piece rates, such that
a firm employing a tournament compensation system can produce a higher output, or
produce the same output at a lower cost, as compared to a firm employing a piece rate
compensation system.
Empirical studies on tournament compensation systems often rely on sports data (e.g.,
Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Bothner et al., 2007; Ka-
plan and Garstka, 2001) and increasingly on field studies from the organizational practice
(Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Bandiera et al., 2005; Matsumura and Shin, 2006; Casas-
Arce and Mart´ınez-Jerez, 2009; Backes-Gellner and Pull, 2013). The first experimental
evidence on tournaments was provided by Bull et al. (1987), to be followed by a wide
range of studies relying on laboratory data (e.g., Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, Freeman
and Gelber, 2010 etc.) A recent, encompassing survey of experimental research on tourna-
ments, contests and all-pay auctions is provided by Dechenaux et al. (forthcoming). Both
the empirical and experimental studies mostly support the basic predictions of tournament
theory. The literature, however, has mainly focused on ‘fixed-prize’ tournament incentives
where the size of the prize (sum) to be awarded is set in advance and is not influenced by
employee performance or firm success.
As long as firm performance can be assessed in advance with reasonable accuracy, a
system of predefined tournament prizes that have to be paid out regardless of the firm’s
success may not pose a severe problem. However, if firm performance is difficult to assess
in advance (e.g., due to an uncertain economic environment), a predetermined tournament
prize may well exceed what the firm can actually afford to pay. In contrast, tournaments
with prizes that are not fixed, but rather depend – or include a component which depends
– on the organization’s performance, eliminate or reduce the hazard of having to pay out
a large prize when the organization is doing poorly.
An additional advantage of tournaments with output-dependent prizes is that they
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carry a smaller risk of horizontal collusion and sabotage. In fixed prize tournaments
contestants can engage in collusive behavior by jointly reducing their effort, or in sabotage
by taking actions to reduce each other’s performance, knowing that the full prize will be
paid out anyway (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003; Bandiera et al., 2005; Harbring et al.,
2007). If the size of the prize (positively) depends on the agents’ joint output, both
collusion and sabotage are less attractive, because they lead to a smaller prize.
There are a few examples of tournaments with variable, rather than fixed, prizes. In
so-called Japanese bonus tournaments, for instance, the bonus an agent receives is not set
in advance, but rather depends on his or her relative performance (Kra¨kel, 2003; Endo,
1984). The bonus sum to be distributed to all of the agents, however, is set in advance, and
does not depend on the agents’ total absolute performance. Similarly, Cason et al. (2010),
Cason et al. (2013) and Shupp et al. (2013) study ‘proportional-prize’ tournaments in which
the prize sum is divided among the agents by their share of the total achievement. Again,
however, the prize sum to be divided does not depend on agents’ total achievement, but is
fixed in advance. The same is true for the ‘share contests’ analysed by Falluchi et al. (2013)
and for the compensation mechanism studied by Chowdhury et al. (2014). Chowdhury and
Sheremeta (2011) and Baye et al. (2012) analyse contests where the prize to be awarded
is fixed, but where additionally the own output and the rival’s output enter the winning
agent’s payoff function. Hence, similarly to our model, agent payoff is influenced by (firm)
performance. Contingent-prize R&D contests (Clark and Riis, 2007) where contestants
can signal their ability by choosing a combination of winning and losing prizes from a
prize menu provide yet another example of variable prize contests. However, since the
prize to be awarded is to be paid in full even when the R&D enterprise is not successful,
the situation is quite different from the type of output-dependent prize tournaments we
study. Lastly, Cohen et al. (2008) analyze all-pay auctions with variable, effort-dependent
rewards. However, while the reward at stake depends on the effort of the winning agent,
it is not influenced by the output of the other agent.
In order to study the comparative advantages of output-dependent prize tournaments,
we compare them with piece rates based on absolute performance and with fixed-prize tour-
naments (see Agranov and Tergiman, 2013, who compare piece rates, relative piece rates
and fixed-prize tournaments for a similar approach). Specifically, we allow for employee
compensation to be linearly dependent on (a) a piece rate based on absolute performance,
(b) a pre-determined fixed prize awarded on the basis of relative performance, and (c) an
output-dependent prize which is also awarded on the basis of relative performance, but
whose size depends on firm success (interpreted as the joint production of agents). We
refer to the latter as ‘output-dependent prize tournaments’.
A possible real world example of output-dependent prizes is an appropriately designed
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profit sharing scheme where employees are rewarded according to the realized profit and
where the share of the profit that goes to an individual employee is based on his or her
relative performance. In our case of a ‘winner-takes-all’-tournament, the best performing
employee receives the full share; in practice, the share of the profit going to the employees
might also be distributed among all employees according to their relative contributions
(as is the case in Japanese bonus tournaments, see above).
Theoretically, we rely on a cost minimization approach when analyzing the optimal
combination of the three incentive types. The focus is on optimal contract design from the
perspective of the principal: whatever quantity is to be produced should be produced with
the lowest possible cost. Our analysis shows that output-dependent prize tournaments are
more cost-effective than piece rates and fixed-prize tournament incentives, the two most
studied types of incentives in the literature.
We test the theoretical predictions with data from a laboratory experiment with both
agent- and principal-participants. Our data qualitatively support the theoretical proposi-
tions: despite the fact that agent-participants systematically deviated from their theoreti-
cally predicted effort level, output-dependent prizes prove to be the most profitable in our
experimental sessions (relative to the conventional alternatives). Principal-participants
seemed to realize this, as they displayed a strong tendency in favor of output-dependent
prizes when designing incentive systems. In sum, our results suggest to foster the use of
output-dependent prizes in the organizational practice.
2 Theoretical Analysis
We analyze the cost minimization problem (CMP) of a principal who employs a group of
agents, assuming that the principal is free to determine the quantity she wished to produce
and the incentive scheme by which the agents are paid. The general optimization problem
of the principal is
pi(x) = R(x)−Cα,β,ω(x) (1)
where x is the production quantity, pi(x) denotes the principal’s profit, R(x) denotes
the revenue, and Cα,β,ω(x) denotes the principal’s cost of producing x with incentive
parameters α, β and ω, which correspond to the three types of incentives we consider
(respectively a fixed prize, an output-dependent prize, and a piece rate). Our aim is to
provide the principal with optimal values of the incentive parameters α∗, β∗, ω∗ that will
minimize the cost function C(x) ≡ Cα∗,β∗,ω∗(x), such that
Cα∗,β∗,ω∗(x) ≤ Cα,β,ω(x) ∀α, β, ω, x.
The CMP is formulated in the tradition of the standard microeconomic theory where the
principal is interested in the cheapest bundle of inputs that results in the production of
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a given output x. The only additional assumption in our analysis is that the efforts of
the agents are mutually best replies. In other words, we solve the market interaction by
backward induction, starting with the (final) subgame between the competing agents, and
then considering the decisions of the principals.
It is important to note that the cost minimizing incentive scheme does not depend
on the structure of the market, and is not affected by (profit reducing) competition with
other principals (as in Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The principal will use the same incentive
scheme as a monopolist, oligopolist or even as a competitor in a market where she cannot
influence the market price at all. The market structure will be reflected by the revenue
function R(x) in (1) and consequently, of course, by the optimal quantity to be produced.
The motivation of our theoretical analysis can be summarized by the following question:
which incentive scheme (i.e., combination of α, β and ω) is optimal in the sense of providing
a given (expected) production amount at minimal cost?
We consider two competing agents, 1 and 2, who may represent individual employees
or teams in the same firm. Both agents i ∈ {1, 2} must choose an effort level xi ≥ x (with
x ≥ 0 ). Each effort xi generates an output of xi+ εi, where εi ∈ [ε, ε¯] is a noise term with
ε < ε¯, x+ ε ≥ 0 and density ϕ(·) with all probability mass in the interval [ε, ε¯] . According
to such an iid-case, the noise levels ε1 and ε2 are stochastically independent and identically
distributed. These restrictions ensure the nonnegativity of the agents’ output. The payoff
of agent i with competitor j 6= i can now be defined as
ui(xi, xj , εi, εj) =


ω(xi + εi)− ci(xi) if xi + εi ≤ xj + εj
ω(xi + εi) + α+ β(xi + εi + xj + εj)− c(xi) otherwise.
(2)
Here, ω ∈ R+ is a piece rate, α ∈ R+ is a fixed prize, β(xi + εi + xj + εj) is an
output-dependent prize (β ∈ R+ determines to which degree the output-dependant prize
depends on firm performance, and ci(xi) denotes the cost of investing effort xi.
1 After
agents independently choose x1 and x2 (their effort levels) and nature selects ε1 and ε2
(according to ϕ(·)), the ranking of the individual (observable) output levels x1 + ε1 and
x2+ε2 determines which agent receives the fixed and output-dependent prizes (α+β(xi+
εi + xj + εj)). Both agents receive the piece rate (ω(xi + εi)).
To test the model experimentally we restrict ourselves to a specific form of ϕ(·) and
ci(·) . In particular, we assume the noise terms εi to be uniformly distributed
2 on [0, ε] and
the effort costs to be quadratic (ci(xi) =
γ
2x
2
i , with γ > 0 for i = 1, 2). Finally, we assume
1Firm performance is simply the sum of the output levels of the two agents (xi + εi + xj + εj).
2Some tournament models (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981) rely on normally distributed noise for the
sake of mathematical convenience. While this violation of economic nonnegativity constraints is easily
sustainable in theory, it is not possible to implement a true (non-truncated) normal distribution in an
experiment.
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that the participants encounter the tournament repeatedly. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume common(ly known) risk neutrality. The expected payoffs of agents i ∈ {1, 2} are
Eui = ω(xi +
ε
2) +
1
ε
ε∫
0
h(xi, xj, εj) dεj −
γ
2
x2i , (3)
where the fist term reflects the expected piece-rate profit of the agent, the second term
the expected profit from winning the tournament, the third term corresponds to the effort
cost, and
h(xi, xj , εj) =


0 if xi ≤ xj + εj − ε ,
1
ε
ε∫
0
[α+ β(xi + εi + xj + εj)] dεi if xi ≥ xj + εj ,
1
ε
ε∫
xj+εj−xi
[α+ β(xi + εi + xj + εj)] dεi otherwise.
The function h distinguishes between three cases: agent i loses for any value of εi (even
εi = ε); agent i wins for any value of εi (even ε = 0); the winner depends on εi.
For β ≥ γε2 the best reply of agent j to xi is xj > xi. Consequently, both agents invest
the maximal possible effort. For β < γε2 the unique equilibrium effort xˆ (in the sense of
mutually best replies) is
xˆ =
2α+ ε(3β + 2ω)
2γε− 4β
for i ∈ {1, 2}, (4)
and the expected joint output is 2xˆ+ ε. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed derivation of
this result.
The principal’s (expected) cost function is composed of the fixed bonus α, which is to
be paid in full regardless of the agents’ production levels; and of the output-dependent
prize β and the piece rate ω, which linearly depend on the production levels:
Cα,β,ω(x1 + x2 + ε) = α+ (β + ω)(x1 + x2 + ε) (5)
Since the principal can implement a three-dimensional incentive scheme (α, β, ω) , the
goal is to find a combination of these three values that yields the expected output of
2xˆ+ ε at a minimal (expected) cost. Formally, this is equivalent to finding a combination
(α, β, ω) that minimizes the costs of the principal on the non-negative part of the plane
defined by equation 4 (graphically illustrated in Figure 1).
Assuming that agents invest effort according to equation 4, we can express α as
α = γxˆε− (2xˆ−
3
2
ε)β − εω (6)
and substitute it in equation 5 to get
Cα,β,ω(2xˆ+ ε) = γεxˆ+ 2xˆω −
ε
2
β. (7)
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βα
ω
γεxˆi
2γεxˆi
3ε+4xˆi
γxˆi
Figure 1: Contracts with an expected output of 2xˆ + ε. All contracts (combinations of
α, β, ω) lie on the triangle which is the non-negative part of the plane defined by (4).
The gradual shading of the triangle corresponds to the expected profit of the principal.
The darker the shade, the more profitable the contract is. The most attractive contract
from the principal’s perspective is located at the intersection of the plane with the β axis,
where only the output-dependent prize is used. The least attractive contract is at the
intersection of the plane with the ω axis, where only a piece rate is paid.
It is easy to see that the (expected) cost function is increasing in ω and decreasing in
β. Thus, the optimal incentive scheme should have the lowest possible value of ω and the
highest possible value of β, which are 0 and 2γεxˆ3ε+4xˆ , respectively. Since it directly follows
(from equation 4) that α = 0, the optimal incentive scheme is
(α, β, ω) =
(
0,
2γεxˆ
3ε + 4xˆ
, 0
)
and the corresponding cost is C(2xˆ + ε) = (2xˆi+ε)2γεxˆ3ε+4xˆ , or, denoting the expected output
2xˆ+ ε as ξ,
C(ξ) =
γεξ(ξ − ε)
ε+ 2ξ
.
From the principal’s point of view, it is best to use the output-dependent prize (β) exclu-
sively, and not include a fixed prize α or piece rate ω in the incentive scheme.
Proposition The output-dependent prize β is more cost-effective than the fixed prize α
which, in turn, is more cost-effective than the piece rate ω .
Our theoretical analysis neglects possible drawbacks (from the principal’s point of view)
of tournament competitions, which may play a role in real organizational, or even experi-
mental, settings, such as collusive behavior, sabotage, and negative effects of competition
on corporate identity. In our view it is obvious that tournaments with output-dependent
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prizes are - in comparison to fixed-prize incentives - relatively immune to collusion, and
to a lesser degree also to sabotage, because if agents reduce their efforts or the output of
others the prize will be smaller. The concern regarding corporate identity is that com-
petition between agents will reduce their feeling of corporate identity, which in return
will reduce their willingness to invest high efforts. Piece rate incentives, as they are not
competitive at all, seem to be the least problematic when considering possible negative
effects on corporate identity, while fixed and output-dependent prizes seem to be similar
in this respect, as they are both competitive.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed with two main questions in mind: Will the theoretically cost
minimizing incentive component (i.e., the output-dependent prize) also be behaviorally the
most cost effective, i.e., will it deliver the same (or similar) output levels at lower labor
costs? Will it be predominantly employed by principals? These two empirical questions
reflect the two stages of our (modified) CMP problem: the first one examines the behavior
of agents in the final subgame, and the second examines the behavior of principals in the
entire CMP.
The experiment was run at the computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of
Economics in Jena, Germany, and included 112 participants, mostly undergraduates of the
University of Jena, enrolled in different fields. Each of the four computerized experimental
sessions (28 participants per session) lasted about 100 minutes. Earnings, including a
show-up fee of e 2.50, ranged from e 4.60 to e 17.44. Upon arrival, each participant was
seated in a visually isolated cubicle. Detailed written and oral instructions (to establish
common knowledge) explained the rules and payoffs of the game and were followed by a
control questionnaire. After the experiment, participants were paid individually and left
the laboratory separately.
In each session, the 28 participants were randomly partitioned into four 7-person
groups. In each group, one participant was assigned the role of ‘principal’ and 6 were
assigned to be ‘agents’. The 7-person groups remained constant throughout the experi-
ment, and this was made known to the participants. Participants did not know which of
the other participants were in their group. Each session was divided into three 10-round
phases, and each phases began with principals selecting one of fifteen available contracts,
defined by combinations of α, β, and ω. In each round the six agents were randomly split
up into three pairs.
In the parametrization of the experiment we assumed uniformly distributed noise (ε ∈
[0, 40]) and that the cost parameter equals 1 (γ = 1). The 15 contracts (i.e., combinations
of α, β, and ω) that principals could choose from at the beginning of each phase all yielded
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the same subgame perfect equilibrium effort of 20 by the agents (xˆ = 20). From (4) it
follows that all of these contracts satisfied
20 =
2α+ 40(3β + 2ω)
80− 4β
⇒ α = 800− 100β − 40ω . (8)
To make the model as simple as possible we decided to abstract from any kind of
competition between firms, and assumed that principals can sell whatever ‘their’ agents
produce at a constant price of 20 per unit.3 Thus, the revenue of principals is
R(x1, x2, ε1, ε2) = 20(x1 + ε1 + x2 + ε2), (9)
and from xˆi = 20, ε = 40, and (5), (8), and (9) it follows that their expected profit is
Eup(α, β, ω, x1, x2, ε1, ε2) = R(x1, x2, ε1, ε2)− Cα,β,ω(x1, x2, ε)
= 20(2xˆi + ε)− (α+ (β + ω)(2xˆ+ ε))
= (20 − β − ω)80− (800 − 100β − 40ω)
= 800 + 20β − 40ω. (10)
As shown in the theoretical section, the principal’s expected profit (10) increases with β
and decreases with ω.
Figure 2 illustrates the 15 available incentive schemes in the plane satisfying (8). The
principal’s choice of one of these contracts set the stage for the interactions of her six
agents in the following ten rounds (i.e., phase). After learning which contract (α, β, ω)
had been implemented by the principal, each agent was randomly paired, in each round,
with one of the other five agents in the same group. Agents were not identifiable, and thus
did not know with whom they were randomly paired in each round
Agent i ∈ {1, 2} could choose an effort level xi ∈ [0, 30], knowing that the random
variable εi is uniformly distributed in εi ∈ [0, 40] and that both cost functions ci(xi), i ∈
{1, 2} are given by
x2
i
2 (i.e., γ = 1). At the end of each round agents were informed about
their own production level, the production level of their partner in that round, and their
earnings, divided into the fixed prize, output-dependent prize, and piece rate components.
Then they were randomly rematched with another agent from the same group and the
next round began.
In line with the fact that organizational incentive schemes are rarely re-designed, and
changes are typically made after a long time of experience with a certain structure, princi-
pals in the experiment were only allowed to change the incentive scheme between phases,
after ten rounds in which the previous incentive scheme has been in effect. Since the six
3This value of 20 is not to be confused with the equilibrium effort of 20 which agents should invest
according to our parametrization. While the use of the same value may be slightly confusing for the reader,
is was not confusing for the participants, as they were not explicitly told that the equilibrium effort is 20.
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βα
ω
800
8
20
0
8
0
200
6
0
400
4
0
600
2
0
800
0
0
0
6
5
200
4
5
400
2
5
600
0
5
0
4
10
200
2
10
400
0
10
0
2
15
200
0
15
0
0
20
α = 0
β = 4
ω = 10
Figure 2: Available contracts. The triangular plane on the left is a specific case of the one
in 1, with the parameters used in the experiment. The triangle on the right corresponds
to the plane on the left, and details the value of each incentive component for each of the
15 contracts that were available to principals. The three numbers in each circle, from top
to bottom, are the values of α, β, and ω.
agents were matched into three pairs in each round, principals could see the results of
thirty (ten rounds, three tournaments in each round) tournaments before deciding on a
new incentive scheme.
Following each round, principals were informed about the production of each agent, the
joint revenue, their cost, and their profit.4 This information remained on the principal’s
screen, and information from the next round was appended to it. Thus, at the end of each
ten-round phase, the principal had on-screen information about all thirty tournaments
which took place in the phase. Additionally, after each of the three phases, principals
received feedback which included the average production, revenues, costs, and profits
across all the tournaments that took place in the phase.
4 Results
4.1 Agents’ Choice of Effort
Since the equilibrium effort is 20 for all of the possible contracts available to principals,
we first check whether agents’ efforts were indeed identical (and equal to 20) across all
contracts. Figure 3 displays the average effort invested by agents for each specific contract.
It is clear that the average effort levels under the different contracts differ from each other
and deviate from the equilibrium effort choice of 20: Average efforts vary from 16.05 in
4production = xi + εi; joint revenue = 20(x1 + ε1 + x2 + ε2); cost = (ω + β)(x1 + ε1 + x2 + ε2) + α;
profit = up
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the lower right-hand corner (α = 800, β = 0, ω = 0) up to 23.35 in the contract with
α = 0, β = 2 and ω = 15. Apparently, agents choose lower (higher) effort levels under
contracts that are theoretically more (less) profitable for the principal.5
18.08
16
18.95
7
19.2
5
16.27
1
16.05
1
18.16
6
21.44
4
19.18
1
−
0
21.66
3
21.8
3
−
0
23.35
1
−
0
−
0
Figure 3: Average efforts and frequency by contract. The average effort invested by agents
under each contract (top) and the number of times the contract was chosen by principals
(bottom) (see Figure 2 for a mapping of contracts to points on the triangle).
Following the above observation, we check whether the contract, characterized either
by the principals’ equilibrium profit, or by the level of each contract component (α, β, ω)
associated with it, is a good predictor of the effort invested by agents.6 Figure 6 graph-
ically displays how agents’ efforts depend on the different characteristics of the incentive
scheme. We use Tobit regressions, taking into account that only observations across groups
are independent (by clustering errors at the group level), with the agents’ efforts as a de-
pendent censored variable.7 The explanatory variables (in four separate regressions) are
the principals’ equilibrium profit, and the level of the α, β, and ω contract components.
As adding the period as an additional explanatory variable in these regressions has a neg-
5This pattern suggests reciprocal behavior on the side of the agents. Since agents are paid less for the
same effort under contracts that maximize the expected profit of the principal, they may be negatively
reciprocating these contract choices by investing less effort (than the equilibrium level). Similarly, agents
may be positively reciprocating choices of contracts that yield less profit to the principal, and higher wages
to themselves, by investing more effort.
6For the purpose of this and the following analyses we use the level of each contract component rather
than its absolute value. For example, while the possible values of the α component are 0, 200, 400, 600,
and 800, the variable included in the analyses has corresponding values of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. The same
holds for the β and ω components.
7Each of these Tobit regressions uses only one explanatory variable (the principal’s equilibrium profit,
the level of the α component, the level of the β component, or the level of the ω component). It is not
possible to include all of these as explanatory variables in the same regression model because they are not
independent from one another; the level of each contract component can be determined by the other two,
and the principals’ equilibrium profit can also be determined by the levels of any pair of components.
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ligible effect on the results (and p > 0.34 for the period coefficient in all four cases), we
proceed to consider the basic regressions (without the period).
The general result from these regressions is that agents systematically deviate from
their equilibrium effort of 20. When we use the principals’ equilibrium profit as the (only)
predictor, the coefficient is −0.00744 (t = −4.05, p < 0.0005). The interpretation of the
coefficient is straightforward; the more profitable a contract is for the principal, the lower
the effort invested by agents. Specifically, an increase of 100 points in the principal’s
equilibrium profit results in a decrease of 0.744 in the agents’ effort.8
Using the level of each of the contract components, rather than the principal’s equi-
librium profit, as the explanatory variable in the Tobit regressions, reveals that agents
react differently to each component.9 The coefficient for the ω component is 1.78 (t =
3.83, p < 0.0005), indicating a rather strong and positive relation between the level of ω
and the agents’ efforts. For the β component the coefficient is −0.78 and only marginally
significant (t = −1.57, p = 0.116), indicating that agents possibly exert less effort the
higher the level of the β component. Most strikingly, agents are not sensitive at all to
the α component of the contracts (coefficient: −0.18, t = −0.30, p = 0.763), the main
incentive component in the incentive literature.
As mentioned above, adding the period number as an explanatory variable does not
change these results, and does not suggest that agents adjust there efforts during the
ten rounds of each phase. To exclude effects of experience from previous phases we ran
the same regressions for first-phase decisions only, and the result was also not significant
(p > 0.93 for all four regressions), leading us to conclude that effort choices did not
systematically change during the course of each phase.
Given the negative relation between the principal’s equilibrium profit and the agents’
effort, principals’ (empirical) profits must be relatively higher than the equilibrium profit
for the theoretically inferior contracts and lower for the superior contracts. Such a pattern
could possibly reverse the hierarchy of contracts, such that theoretically superior contracts
are (empirically) less profitable (to the principals) than theoretically inferior ones. How-
ever, as can be seen in the right of Figure 4, agents’ deviations from the optimal effort
only marginally alter the profitability ranking from the principal’s perspective. With one
exception (the 5th and 7th theoretically ranked contracts switch positions in the empirical
ranking), the empirical ranking of profits corresponds to the theoretical one.
8The small value of the coefficient is somewhat misleading and results from the difference in scales
between the equilibrium profits (0 to 960) and the effort level interval from which agents could choose (0
to 30). Considering the full ranges of possible payoffs and effort levels, an increase of 10.4% (of the full
range) in payoffs is accompanied by an increase of 2.5% in effort.
9Figure 6 in the Appendix visualizes the dependency of agents’ effort on the level of α, β, and ω, and
the equilibrium profit of the principal, depending on contract choice.
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−
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Figure 4: Principal profits by contract. The numbers on the left are the theoretical
(top; assuming that agents choose equilibrium efforts) and empirical (bottom) profits of
the principals for each available contract. The numbers on the right are rankings of the
theoretical and empirical principal profits which appear on the left (see Figure 2 for a
mapping of contracts to points on the triangles).
Accordingly, using principals’ equilibrium profit to predict their actual profit in a linear
regression (taking into account that only observations across groups are independent)
reveals a very strong and positive relation. The coefficient of the equilibrium profit is 0.67
(t = 5.47, p < 0.0005), indicating that an increase of 1 point in the theoretical profit was
accompanied by an increase of 0.67 points in the actual profit.
Results – Agents Agents systematically deviated from the equilibrium effort level; the
better a contract was for the principal (in equilibrium), the less effort was invested by
agents. Efforts were positively related to ω, (marginally) negatively to β, and were not
related to α. Despite these deviations, the empirical and theoretical rankings of contracts
from the principal’s point of view were highly correlated. Effort choices were stable within
each (ten-period) phase.
4.2 Principals’ Choice of Incentive Scheme
The second part of our analysis examines the choices of contracts made by principals.
Figure 3 describes how often each incentive scheme was chosen. As can be clearly seen in
the figure, the (theoretically and empirically) most attractive contract from the principals’
perspective (α = 0, β = 8, ω = 0) is also the one chosen most frequently, and particularly
unattractive schemes are not chosen at all. However, there are also theoretically attractive
incentive schemes (e.g., in the lower right-hand corner of the triangle) that were hardly
ever chosen by the principals – who apparently anticipated agents’ suboptimal efforts in
these particular incentive schemes.
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Equilibrium profit Empirical profit
Comparison S p S p
Phase one – phase two -14.5 0.2622 -5 0.8209
Phase one – phase three -6.0 0.6338 -11 0.5966
Phase two – phase three 10.5 0.4033 5 0.8209
Table 1: Principals’ contract dynamics. S – Wilcoxon signed rank sum test statistic; p –
significance level
Figure 7 in the Appendix visualizes the frequency of contract choices as a function of the
level of α, β, and ω, and of the principal’s equilibrium profit. Since the contracts are clearly
ranked in terms of the equilibrium profit of the principal, and especially since the empirical
profits closely preserve this ranking, we checked whether principals indeed chose contracts
that were more profitable to them, namely, contracts with a high β (and α) component
and a low ω component. Figure 3 shows that this is mostly the case. Both the contracts’
theoretical and empirical profits are highly correlated with the frequency with which they
were chosen (r = 0.61, p = 0.0161; r = 0.60, p = 0.049; respectively). Principals display
a very strong tendency to choose contracts with high β levels (r = 0.90, p < 0.0001), and
a weaker tendency to rely on contracts with low ω levels (r = −0.50, p = 0.0594). The
correlation between the level of the α component and the contracts’ frequency is negative,
but not significant (r = −0.4056, p = 0.1337).
Do principals change their contract choices in a systematic way during the experiment?
Principals have only two opportunities to adapt the contract – once after the first phase and
once after the second – but they receive a lot of feedback information (thirty tournaments
per phase). Thus, one can reasonably expect that they will choose more favorable contracts
as the experiment progresses, e.g., due to the ‘law of effect’, as propagated by reinforcement
learning (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998).
To check for systematic changes in principals’ contract choices across phases, we com-
pared, for each principal, the equilibrium profits of the contracts she chose in the first and
second phase. Similarly, we compared the first phase to the third phase and the second
phase to the third phase. We also conducted equivalent comparisons for the empirical
profits. Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests, however, do not reveal any systematic differences
(Table 1).10
Results – Principals Principals tended to choose the (theoretically and empirically)
superior contracts, and were primarily sensitive to the β component. Contract choices did
not change systematically from phase to phase.
10The lack of noticeable dynamics in principals’ contract choices may be partly due to the fact that in
many cases principals already started out by relying heavily on output-dependent prize incentives (β) in
the first phase and therefore had little room for improvement in subsequent phases.
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5 Discussion
Tournaments are often used by firms and organizations as supplements to more standard
reward schemes, like salaries or piece rates. Here we introduced output-dependent prize
tournaments, where the size of the prize depends on firm performance, which in turn
depends on the effort of the competing agents, and showed both theoretically and ex-
perimentally that output-dependant prize tournaments outperform two other well studied
compensation schemes, namely piece rates and fixed prize tournaments.
The main goal of our theoretical analysis was to find an incentive scheme (based on a
combination of a piece-rate, a fixed prize and an output-dependent prize) that minimizes
the principal’s (or firm’s) cost of producing a pre-determined output. We based our theo-
retical approach on a classical cost minimizing problem (CMP) to prove its independence
of the market environment.11 According to our modified CMP, the firm chooses its best
incentive scheme, assuming (by backward induction) that agents exert the equilibrium
efforts in the resulting subgames. We show that the equilibrium of this game (which
constitutes a proper subgame of the entire market game) is largely independent of the pa-
rameters of the model (e.g., cost function, noise distribution), and that it simply requires
that the firm incentivizes the agents solely on the basis of an output-dependent prize, and
avoids piece-rate and the fixed prize incentives.
By restricting our analysis to the (modified) CMP, and abstracting from the particular
structure of the market in which the firm operates, we show that our result is rather
general and robust. The solution of the CMP - to use only an output-dependent prize
as an incentive - can be applied in any market situation, such as Cournot or Stackelberg
(both if the firm is leader or follower) markets, and even when the firm is a monopoly.
The lower expected cost of exerting a given amount of effort from the agents is not
the only advantage of output-dependent prizes over fixed prizes; they also bear less poten-
tial for collusion and sabotage, since both reduce firm performance and hence lower the
tournament prize. All together, output-dependent prize tournaments seem to be a very
attractive compensation system from the point of view of firms.
There are also possible negative aspects associated with the use of output-dependent
prizes. An obvious one is the negative externality on agents – if firms can pay less for
the same effort by using output-dependent prizes, it is necessarily at the agents’ expense.
Another negative aspect of output-dependent prizes, from the point of view of (risk averse)
agents, is that both the size of the prize and the probability of winning it are affected by
their own idiosyncratic uncertainty (captured by ε in our model) and by the idiosyncratic
uncertainty of the other agents. In comparison, in fixed prize tournaments idiosyncratic
11See Gu¨th et al. (2015) on the potential interaction effects between the choice of compensation and
inter-firm competition.
15
uncertainty (both one’s own and that of the other agents) affects only the probability
of winning (but not the size of the prize), and when piece rates are used idiosyncratic
uncertainty affects only the size of the prize (but not the probability of winning). This
increased uncertainty might lead risk averse agents to perceive the already unfriendly
output-dependent prizes (in terms of expected profits) as even less friendly.
Such negative perceptions by the agents can adversely affect firms’ profits. Agents
may (negatively) reciprocate the instalment of what they perceive as an unfriendly com-
pensation system – in the case of output-dependant prizes, due to low expected profits
and increased uncertainty – by decreasing their efforts below the equilibrium level, as
suggested by various reciprocity theories. This pattern is indeed suggested by our data,
although in our case agents’ deviations from the equilibrium effort level did not suffice to
render output-dependent prizes unattractive for principals.
We are aware that of the many possible market structures (e.g., Cournot, Stackelberg,
monopolistic) we experimentally explore a particular case where the principals (firms) are
price takers (as in a perfectly competitive market). In such an experimental market, all of
the strategic considerations of the principal-participants are devoted to choosing the opti-
mal incentive scheme for paying their agents, and (horizontal) between-firm competition
is disregarded, such that our principal-participants did not have to deal with the added
complexity of operating in a competitive market. Experimental work on more complex
market constellations can shed more light on the practical advantages and shortcomings
of output-dependent prizes.
References
Agranov, M., Tergiman, C., 2013. Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental
study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 238–247.
Backes-Gellner, U., Pull, K., 2013. Tournament compensation systems, employee hetero-
geneity and firm performance. Human Resource Management 52 (3), 375–398.
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., Rasul, I., 2005. Social preferences and the response to incen-
tives: Evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3), 917–962.
Baye, M., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C. G., 2012. Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers.
Economic Theory, 51, 351–350.
Becker, B., Huselid, M., 1992. The incentive effects of tournament compensation systems.
Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 336–350.
Bothner, M., Kang, J., Stuart, T., 2007. Competitive crowding and risk taking in a tour-
16
nament: Evidence from NASCAR racing. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (2),
208–247.
Bull, C., Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., 1987. Tournaments and piece rates: An experimental
study. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1–33.
Casas-Arce, P., Mart´ınez-Jerez, F. A., 2009. Relative performance compensation, contests,
and dynamic incentives. Management Science 55 (8), 1306–1320.
Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., Sheremeta, R. M., 2010. Entry into winner-take-all
and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study. Journal of Public Economics
94 (910), 604–611.
Cason, T.N., Masters, W. A., Sheremeta, R. M., 2013. Winner-take-all and proportional-
prize contests: theory and experimental results. Economic Science Institute, Working
Paper.
Charness, G., Kuhn, P., 2011. Chapter 3 – lab labor: What can labor economists learn
from the lab? Vol. 4, Part A of Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier, 229–330.
Chowdhury, S. M., Sheremeta, R. M., 2011. A Generalized Tullock Contest. Public Choice,
147, 413–420.
Chowdhury S. M., Sheremeta, R. M., Turocy, T. L., 2014. Overbidding and overspread-
ing in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. Games and
Economic Behavior. 87, 224–238.
Clark, D., Riis, C., 2007. Contingent payments in selection contests. Review of Economic
Design 11 (2), 125–137.
Cohen, C., Kaplan, T. R., Sela, A., 2008. Optimal rewards in contests. The Rand Journal
of Economics 39 (2), 434–451.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. M. (forthcoming). A survey of experimental
research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics.
Ehrenberg, R., Bognanno, M., 1990. Do tournaments have incentive effects? Journal of
Political Economy 98, 1307–1324.
Endo, K., 1984. Satei (personal assessment) and interworker competition in japanese firms.
Industrial Relations 33 (1), 70–82.
Erev, I., Roth, A. E., 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning
in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. The American Economic
Review 88 (4), 848–881.
17
Fallucchi, F., Renner, E., Sefton, M., 2013. Information feedback and contest structure in
rent-seeking games. European Economic Review, 64, 223–240.
Freeman, R. B., Gelber, A. M., 2010. Prize structure and information in tournaments:
Experimental evidence. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (1), 149–
164.
Gu¨rtler, O., Kra¨kel, M., 2010. Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 75 (2), 180–191.
Gu¨th, W., Pull, K., Stadler, M., 2015. Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic
competition. Journal of Business Economics 85 (1), 1–13.
Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B., 2003. An experimental study on tournament design. Labour
Economics 10 (4), 443–464.
Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B., 2008. How many winners are good to have?: On tournaments
with sabotage. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 65 (34), 682–702.
Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B., Kra¨kel, M., Selten, R., 2007. Sabotage in corporate contests
– an experimental analysis. International Journal of the Economics of Business 14 (3),
367–392.
Irlenbusch, B., 2006. Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations. Central
European Journal of Operations Research 14, 1–24.
Kaplan, E., Garstka, S., 2001. March madness and the office pool. Management Science
47 (3), 369–382.
Knoeber, C. R., Thurman, W. N., 1994. Testing the theory of tournaments: An empirical
analysis of broiler production. Journal of Labor Economics 12 (2), 155–179.
Kra¨kel, M., 2003. U-type versus J-type tournaments as alternative solutions to the unver-
ifiability problem. Labour Economics 10 (3), 359–380.
Kra¨kel, M., 2008. Emotions in tournaments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-
zation 67 (1), 204–214.
Lazear, E., Rosen, S., 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal
of Political Economy 89 (5), 606–620.
Matsumura, E. M., Shin, J. Y., 2006. An empirical analysis of an incentive plan with
relative performance measures: Evidence from a postal service. Accounting Review 81,
533–566.
18
McLaughlin, K. J., 1988. Aspects of tournament models: A survey. Research in Labor
Economics 9, 225–56.
Orrison, A., Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., 2004. On the design of optimal organizations using
tournaments: An experimental examination. Management Science 50 (2), 268–279.
Roth, A. E., Erev, I., 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and
simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1),
164–212.
Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R. M., Schmidt, D., Walker, J., 2013. Resource allocation contests:
Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 257–267.
19
Appendix
A.1 Derivation
In this section we derive the equilibrium effort level of the agents, starting with their
expected payoff, as given in Equation 3:
Eui = ω(xi +
ε
2) +
1
ε
ε∫
0
h(xi, xj , εj) dεj −
γ
2
x2i , (3 revisited)
with
h(xi, xj , εj) =


0 if xi ≤ xj + εj − ε ,
1
ε
ε∫
0
[α+ β(xi + εi + xj + εj)] dεi if xi ≥ xj + εj ,
1
ε
ε∫
xj+εj−xi
[α+ β(xi + εi + xj + εj)] dεi otherwise.
Expressing the definite integrals in the definition of the function h(xi, xj, εj) we get
h(xi, xj , εj) =


0 if xi ≤ xj + εj − ε ,
α+ β(xi +
ε
2 + xj + εj)] if xi ≥ xj + εj ,
1
2ε(xi + ε− xj − εj)[2α+ β(xi + ε+ 3xj + 3εj)] otherwise.
Substituting h(xi, xj , εj) in Equation (3) and differentiating the expected profit with
respect to xi we get
∂Eui
∂xi
=


ω − γxi if xi ≤ xj + εj − ε ,
ω + β − γxi if xi ≥ xj + εj ,
1
2ε [2ωε + 2α + β(2xi + 2xj + 3ε)− 2εγxi] otherwise,
and the best reply of i to j, assuming a symmetric equilibrium, is
xi =
β
εγ − β
xj +
2ωε+ 2α+ 3εβ
2(εγ − β)
.
When β
εγ−β
≥ 1 (rewritten as β ≥ γε2 ) i’s best reply to any xj is xi > xj . From the
symmetry between i and j it follows that when β ≥ γε2 both agents invest the maximal
effort. When β < γε2 , and again considering the symmetry between i and j, the unique
equilibrium effort xˆ (in the sense of mutually best replies) must satisfy the first order
condition
2ωε+ 2α+ β(4xˆ+ 3ε)− 2εγxˆ = 0,
resulting in
xˆ =
2α+ ε(3β + 2ω)
2γε− 4β
for i ∈ {1, 2}. (4 revisited)
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A.2 Instructions
The situation
This experiment consists of multiple rounds. Before the first round, we will randomly
assign you to one of two possible roles, namely the A-role and the P-role, which you will
keep throughout the entire experiment. There will be groups of one P-participant and six
A-participants that stay together over 10 rounds (=1 phase). In each round, the six A-
participants in a group will be split up randomly in three pairs. Thus, each A-participant
faces the same P-participant in all the 10 rounds of one phase, but is very likely to be
paired with a different A-participant in each round.
The decision process
At the beginning of each phase, the P-participant determines a reward scheme for his/her
group. The components of these reward schemes are explained below. After that, and
knowing the reward scheme, the A-participants choose their action: each of the two A-
participants in a pair independently chooses a number between 0 and 30.
Suppose that one A-participant chooses x and the other xˆ. These choices are linked
to costs of 12x
2 and 12 xˆ
2, respectively. The choice of x is linked to an output of y = x+ ε,
and the choice of xˆ is linked to an output of yˆ = xˆ + εˆ. ε and εˆ are independently and
evenly distributed random variables in the intervals 0 ≤ ε ≤ 40 and 0 ≤ εˆ ≤ 40. In other
words, any possible value of ε and εˆ is equally likely to occur, and both random variables
are drawn independently from each other.
If the output of the A-participant who chose x is larger or equal to the output of the
A-participant who chose xˆ, i.e., y ≥ yˆ, the A-participant who chose x earns cy+ a+ b(y+
yˆ) − x
2
2 , and the A-participant who chose xˆ only earns cy −
xˆ2
2 . In other words, only the
A-participant whose output is not smaller than the output of the other A-participant in
the pair, receives the extra payment a+ b(y + yˆ).
The first part of the extra payment, a, does not depend on the total output y + yˆ of
a pair, while the second part of the payment, b(y + yˆ), increases linearly with the total
output y + yˆ - if and when b is larger than zero.
The payment of cy and cyˆ is independent of whether y ≥ yˆ. Thus, when c is larger
than zero, the payment of cy and cyˆ ensures that A-participants receive a payment that
increases in their individual output.
The P-participant earns a constant amount of 20 ECU for each unit of output, minus
the payments to the six A-participants. For each pair of A-participants, the P-participant
earns (20 − c− b)(y + yˆ)− a.
The P-participant is not free to choose any possible reward system (a, b, c), but must
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choose one of the following 15 rewards systems, where the first, second and third numbers
in each cell stand for a, b, and c:
0, 0, 20 0, 2, 15 0, 4, 10 0, 6, 5 0, 8, 0
200, 0, 15 200, 2, 10 200, 4, 5 200, 6, 0
400, 0, 10 400, 2, 5 400, 4, 0
600, 0, 5 600, 2, 0
800, 0, 0
The experiment ends after 3 phases (30 rounds). Your payment is the sum of all your
earnings in all periods. This sum is converted to Euro with the following conversion rate:
1 Euro = 4000 ECU.
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
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Figure 5: Mean group efforts – all observations. Each of the 48 (16 groups × 3
phases) plots describes average efforts for a specific group in one (10-round) phase. The
horizontal axis in each plot is the ‘round’ axis, going from 1 (left) to 10 (right), and the
vertical axis is the effort axis, going from 0 (bottom) to 30 (top). The horizontal line
in each plot marks the equilibrium effort of 20. Each plot is labeled with information
regarding the group, phase, and the contract that was in effect. The group number (1-16)
is prefixed by ‘G’; the phase number (1-3) by ‘S’; and the 3 numbers separated by dashes
pertain to the α, β, and ω components of the contract that was chosen by the principal
for the phase. For example, the top left plot is labeled ‘G1 P1 0-6-5’. This means that
the data pertains to average efforts of group number one during the first phase, and that
the principal chose α = 0, β = 6, and ω = 5.
A.3. Figures
23
Figure 6: Mean efforts of agents as a function of the level of each contract component and
of the theoretical principal payoff, with Tobit regression lines. Each dot represents the
average efforts of members of a single group in one phase.
Figure 7: Frequency of contract choices as a function of the level of each contract compo-
nent and of the theoretical principal payoff, with linear regression lines. Each small dot
represents one of the 15 available contracts. Larger dots indicate that multiple contracts
share the same frequency and horizontal-axis value.
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